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A Comparative Look at the Right to
Refuse Treatment for Involuntarily
Hospitalized Persons with a Mental Illness
By JENNIFER FISCHER*
Introduction
The issues surrounding the legal responsibility of caring for and
maintaining a person with a mental illness go back almost 2500 years.'
The Romans asked questions that reverberate today: "What was the legal
status of a mentally disabled person during his lucid moments? Was he
still under the protection of a guardian? If not, was it necessary to name a
new guardian each time the illness returned?
' 2
The answers to these kinds of questions have changed over time in
response to changes in culture and advances in technology.3  With the
advent of psychotropic medications in the 1950s, it became easier to treat
patients with mental illnesses in the community.4 These same years saw a
push for greater civil rights. Concerns about how patients were treated in
mental hospitals, along with the serious side effects that came with the use
* J.D. 2005 magna cum laude, University of Minnesota Law School. After
graduating from law school, Ms. Fischer worked and volunteered in Barcelona,
Spain, learning a different perspective on the treatment of persons with mental
illnesses than that found in the United States. This article is written in memory of
my brother Alex who has inspired me to work with and research the rights of
persons with mental illnesses. I would also like to thank my family for their love
and support and Professor Michael Perlin, without whom this article would never
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1. MICHAEL PERLIN, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2A-2. I a (2d
ed. 1999) [hereinafter PERLIN 1].
2. Id.
3. See generally PERLIN 1, supra note 1, § 2A-2.1 (summarizing the history of caring
for mentally disabled persons).
4. MICHAEL PERLIN, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 3B-2 (2d ed.
1999) [hereinafter PERLIN 2].
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of the new medications, led advocates for persons with mental illnesses to
raise questions about involuntary hospitalization and treatment. 5 Who
should be involuntarily hospitalized? Once hospitalized, should these
persons have a right to consent or refuse to take medications? There has
been considerable debate about these questions in the past few decades,
especially in North America and Western Europe. As the importance of
mental health and rights of persons with mental disabilities take on greater
significance internationally, however, the debate is moving to the rest of
the world.
The objective of this paper is to look at the various perspectives in the
current debate and at how different countries around the world have
answered these questions. Part I of this paper examines the debate over the
right to involuntarily hospitalize persons with a mental illness and those
persons' right to consent to or refuse treatment 6 once hospitalized. Part II
will focus on how this debate has been dealt with on the level of
international law. Part III will then take a comparative look at how various
countries and regions around the world have come out on the debate and as
much as possible examine how the culture and economic realities of the
various countries affect these determinations.
Framing the Debate: Doctors Versus Lawyers
The advent in the early 1950s of new psychiatric drugs revolutionized
the treatment of mental illness.7 Unfortunately, problems soon arose.8 Due
to a high risk of misdiagnosis, there was a risk of misadministration of the
drugs. 9  For those persons correctly diagnosed, there were questions
whether the drugs really helped all patients.' ° Possibly more disconcerting
was the evidence that staff in state facilities often used drugs for
punishment and their own convenience, rather than for treatment." In
addition, toxic side effects appeared, including: parkinsonisms (drooling,
muscle stiffness, shuffling gate, and tremors), drowsiness, weakness,
dizziness, low blood pressure, loss of sexual desire, apathy, and tardive
5. Id.
6. In examining the right to refuse treatment, for purposes of this paper, treatment
refers to standard psychiatric or medical treatment and not exceptional or invasive treatment
such as electro-shock therapy, sterilization, major medical or surgical procedures,
psychosurgery or clinical trials and experimental treatments.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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dyskinesia (uncontrollable movements which in the worst cases can lead to
death), just to name a few.12
In light of these concerns, the debate over the right to consent to or
refuse treatment became a battle between physicians and others concerned
about their ability to treat a person who is ill, and patients' rights activists
concerned about patients' autonomy and human rights.1 3  These two
models are often termed the medical model and the civil rights model.
1 4
A. The Medical Model
The medical model focuses primarily on health as a societal value
with a corresponding right to treatment. 5 Under this model, mental health
problems are considered to be potential obstacles to health care, requiring
admittance to a hospital for treatment.' 6  Because the rationale of
involuntary admission is to give treatment, it alone should justify a forced
intervention solely upon a medical decision.' 7 Allowing an involuntarily
hospitalized person to refuse treatment is inconsistent with the objective of
the hospitalization.' 8 Furthermore, refusing hospitalization or treatment is
simply perceived as a symptom of the mental illness.' 9 To allow an
involuntarily hospitalized person to refuse a treatment that would return
them to their autonomous selves and give them their freedom, in both the
psychological and literal sense, is illogical. 20 A less philosophical concern
is that a patient who refuses treatment may have a negative effect on other
12. Id. Of these side effects, tardive dyskinesia is the most feared, the most irreversible,
and very common. Id. The effects of tardive dyskinesia include uncontrollable movements,
especially of the face and mouth. In severe cases, it can impede walking and even breathing
and digestion. Id. Not only does tardive dyskinesia create a grotesque appearance, but also
can endanger one's health. Id.
13. ELYN R. SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY ILL 5-19 (2002).
14. Hans Joachim Salize, Harald Drebing & Monika Peitz, Compulsory Admission and
Involuntary Treatment of Mentally Ill Patients - Legislation and Practice in EU-Member
States (May 15, 2002), available at <europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph_projects/2000/
promotion/fp_promotion_2000_frep_08_en.pdf>.
15. Caroline Gendreau, The Rights of Psychiatric Patients in the Light of the Principles
Announced by the United Nations: A Recognition of the Right to Consent to Treatment?, 20
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 259, 269 (1997).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 269-70.
18. Id. at 269.
19. Id.
20. M. Gupta, Treatment Refusal in the Involuntarily Hospitalized Psychiatric
Population: Canadian Policy and Practice, 20 MED. & L. 245, 246 (2001).
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patients and staff.2 1
B. The Civil Rights Model
The civil rights model is founded on values of autonomy and equality
with a corresponding right to consent to or refuse treatment.2 E In other
words, having a mental illness, itself, does not make a person incompetent
to make decisions about her treatment.2 3 In fact, the MacCarthur Treatment
Competence Study has shown that when it comes to the ability to make
treatment decisions, there is little difference between most patients
hospitalized with a mental illness and people without a mental illness.24
Therefore, by making the assumption that a person with a mental illness is
incompetent, without more evidence of the incompetence, that person is
being treated differently from other people who have an illness that they
choose not to treat. Although many countries treat evidence of
dangerousness as that additional evidence, dangerousness alone does not
26
actually prove incompetence. For example, society also allows someone
with lung cancer to smoke, an injured person to refuse a life-saving blood
transfusion, and people to go without food, clothing, and shelter either by
27
choice or poverty. All of these people have engaged in dangerous
behavior, but no one is proposing that these same people be forced into a
hospital or other detention for treatment.28 Such disparate treatment is
discriminatory. 9 Some proponents of the civil rights model, therefore,
21. Id. at 246-47.
22. Gendreau, supra note 15, at 269.
23. Gendreau, supra note 15, at 269.
24. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study: I. Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 L. & HuM. BEHAV 105
(1995); Thomas Grisso, Paul S. Appelbaum, Edward Mulvey & Kenneth Fletcher, The
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: 11. Measures of Abilities Related to Competence
to Consent to Treatment, 19 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 127 (1995); Thomas Grisso & Paul S.
Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: III. Abilities of Patients to
Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatment, 19 L. & HuM. BEHAV., 149 (1995). The
executive summary of The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study is available at
<macarthur.virginia.edu/treatment.html>. See also Barton W. Palmer et al., Correlates of
Treatment-Related Decision-Making Capacity Among Middle-Aged and Older Patients With
Schizophrenia, 61 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 230 (2004); William T. Carpenter et al.,
Decisional Capacity for Informed Consent in Schizophrenia Research, 57 ARCHIVES OF
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 533 (2000); Debra A. Pinals et al., Informed Consent in Schizophrenia
Research, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 244 (1998).
25. Gupta, supra note 20, at 256-57.
26. Gupta, supra note 20, at 258.
27. SAKS, supra note 13, at46.
28. SAKS, supra note 13, at 46.
29. Gupta, supra note 20, at 258.
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argue that the issue should not be about dangerousness, but about capacity
to make hospitalization and treatment decisions, how likely the person is to
suffer deterioration, and how treatable she is.
30
As it stands now, there are few governments that require incapacity to
be shown in order to involuntarily hospitalize for mental illness.3' The
hospitalization requirements, therefore, do not ensure that an involuntarily
hospitalized person is incapable of making a decision for herself about
32treatment. For this reason, under the civil rights model, involuntarily
detained persons with a mental illness should be presumed competent until
proven otherwise, and given the right to consent to and refuse treatment.
33
While equality and autonomy are the primary tenets of the civil rights
model, other concerns raised include the legitimacy of delegating coercive
social control power to psychiatrists and whether forced medication
violates the patient's rights to privacy and freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment.34
C. Therapeutic Jurisprudence
An alternative theory that is emerging in the United States is that of
therapeutic jurisprudence.35 Therapeutic jurisprudence looks at the healing
potential of the law. 36 It recognizes that substantive rules, legal procedures
and lawyers' roles may have therapeutic benefit, contrary to the beliefs of
adherents of the medical model, but may also have anti-therapeutic
consequences, contrary to the beliefs of adherents of the civil rights
model.37 It then sets about looking at these effects and attempts to make
changes in the law that minimize its anti-therapeutic consequences and
maximize its therapeutic consequences. 38 It is, therefore, a middle ground
between blindly insisting on due process rights that may or may not benefit
the patient, and the patronizing insistence that a patient with a mental
illness does not know what is in her best interest.
30. Gupta, supra note 20, at 259.
31. See infra Part III.
32. Gupta, supra note 20, at 246.
33. Gupta, supra note 20, at 246.
34. Gendreau, supra note 15, at 269-70; Gupta, supra note 20, at 246.
35. See generally DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); David Wexler, Putting Mental
Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27
(1992).
36. Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Counsel in Litigation,
37 CAL. W. L. REV. 105, 108 (2000).
37. PERLIN 1, supra note 1, at § 2D-3 (summarizes theory of therapeutic jurisprudence).
38. Winnick, supra note 36, at 108.
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One of the most notable cases demonstrating the therapeutic
jurisprudence perspective is Lessard v. Schmidt,3 9 the United States case
that established that "a finding of 'dangerousness' to self or others is
necessary in order to deprive an individual of his or her freedom ' 40 for
treatment of a mental illness.41 In Lessard, the court first looked at the
roots of the state's involuntary civil commitment power and found that the
same fundamental liberties were at stake in both civil commitment and
criminal proceedings requiring the same procedural safeguards.42 In
arriving at its conclusions, the court looked at the effect of civil
commitment on the person committed, including evidence that lengthy
hospitalizations may actually increase the symptoms of mental illness and
make transition to society more difficult. The court also considered the
substantial loss of civil rights faced by the committed individual. 3 The
court gave little credence to the state's contention that notice and an
evidentiary hearing in the early stages of confinement may be detrimental
to the health of the patient." Rather, the court's response to this contention
is most reflective of the court's analysis of therapeutic benefits of due
process:45 "[The] conclusion [that due process is mandated at involuntary
civil commitment hearings] is fortified by medical evidence that indicates
that patients respond more favorably to treatment when they feel the staff
and the system are treating them fairly and as intelligent, aware, human
beings.' ,46 The benefits of using a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective are
evident in this decision where "the court was able to fashion a workable
standard that took into account the concerns of the state to protect society,
provide appropriate care and treatment to its mentally ill citizens, and
protect the dignity and civil rights of persons thought to be in need of
involuntary civil commitment.
' 47
The right to refuse treatment has a strong therapeutic jurisprudence
component.48 Research shows that this right can have therapeutic benefits,
39. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on
procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
40. Id. at 1093.
41. Michael L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould & Deborah A. Dorfman, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless
Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 80, 88 (1995).
42. Lessard, F. Supp. at 1084.
43. Id. at 1087, 1090-91.
44. Id. at 1091.
45. Perlin, supra note 41, at 90.
46. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1101-02.
47. Perlin, supra note 41, at 90.
48. Perlin, supra note 41, at 110.
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including: providing due process rights for persons with a mental illness;
improving checks on doctors and clinical staff; ensuring that "medication
and other treatment is not being administered as a means of punishment or
convenience; and improving protection from administration of
inappropriate medications or medications causing severe side effects,
among others. ' 49  Studies have found due process protections provide
therapeutic benefits in several ways. 50 First, a formal hearing may force the
individual to face reality and provides them with an opportunity to present
their own case as well as hear the evidence against them in a formal
setting. 51 Due process also provides the appearance of fairness, increasing
the individual's sense of dignity and of being taken seriously. 52 Studies
have also shown that medication judicial-administrative proceedings have
therapeutic value in that they ensure that patients have the opportunity to
thoroughly discuss the medications and their benefits and side effects with
their doctors.53  Misuse of psychotropic medication has long been
recognized as a concern to both social scientists and courts, 54 and research
49. Perlin, supra note 41, at 111-16.
50. Perlin, supra note 41, at 113-14 (citing Francine Coumos et al., A Comparison of
Clinical and Judicial Procedures for Reviewing Requests for Involuntary Medication in
New York, 39 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 851, 854 (1988)); Paul Sauvayre, The
Relationship Between the Court and the Doctor on the Issue of an Inpatient's Refusal of
Psychotropic Medication, 36 J. FORENSIC Sci. 219, 221 (1991) (citing Irwin Hasenfeld &
Barbara Grumet, A Study of the Right to Refuse Treatment, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 65 (1984) (patients who initially refuse treatment and complete a judicial
hearing as to their capacity to refuse treatment did better after discharge than those who
complied with treatment)).
51. Perlin, supra note 41, at 113-14 (citing John Ensminger & Thomas Liguori, The
Therapeutic Significance of the Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, in
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW As A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 243, 245 (David
Wexler ed., 1990).
52. Perlin, supra note 41, at 114 (citing Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil
Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE
LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 309, 323 n.83 (David Wexler ed., 1990), Tom R. Tyler, The
Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications For Civil Commitment
Hearings, 46 SMu L. REV. 433, 444 (1992) (discussing therapeutic value of judicial civil
commitment hearings, and stressing that individuals benefit from hearings in which they can
take part, are treated with dignity, and are "fair")).
53. Perlin, supra note 41, at 114 (citing Francine Cournos et al., A Comparison of
Clinical and Judicial Procedures for Reviewing Requests for Involuntary Medication in
New York, 39 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 851, 854 (1988), Julie Zito et al., Drug
Treatment Refusal, Diagnosis, and Length of Hospitalization in Involuntary Psychiatric
Patents, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 327, 336 (1986), and Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse
Mental Health Treatment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 17 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 99 (1994)).
54. Perlin, supra note 41, at 114 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 242-43
(1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting), Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
2006]
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has shown that a right to refuse treatment and the due process proceedings
accompanying this right are effective in preventing such misuse. 55 Finally,
medication hearings provide a check to ensure that doctors are not
prescribing the wrong medications, the wrong dosages, or ignoring
patient's concerns about side effects.56 Such a check is important because
even if administered in good faith, psychotropic medication can be anti-
therapeutic if there is a misdiagnosis, the patient is not given proper follow-
up monitoring, or the side effects outweigh the benefits of the medication. 7
There are of course arguments that due process is not therapeutic in
that it will lead to longer hospital stays for refusers and that patients will
become less compliant in their use of medications.5 8  The research,
however, does not support these conclusions, but rather shows that patients
who refuse treatment do not have longer involuntary hospitalizations and
that the rate of medication noncompliance did not change once due process
proceedings were established.59
Unfortunately, although providing a right to refuse treatment and
accompanying procedural protections can be therapeutic, the manner in
concurring), Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 335 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)). In
Washington v. Harper, Justice Stevens expressed his concerns that the failure to require that
medication decisions be made by an independent party could lead to the improper use of
medication for control purposes rather than for treatment. Harper, 494 U.S. at 245-46. See
also, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 (D.N.J. 1979) (evidence at trial
indicated that psychiatric medications were being used routinely as a means of patient
control and as a substitute for treatment), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir.
1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
55. Perlin, supra note 41, at 114 (citing Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 926-27
(N.D. Ohio 1980), Mary C. McCarron, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs:
Safeguarding the Mentally Incompetent Patient's Right to Procedural Due Process, 73
MARO. L. REV. 477, 484 (1990)).
56. Perlin, supra note 41, at 115 (citing Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1305-06).
57. Perlin, supra note 41, at 115 (citing Deborah A. Dorfman, Through a Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Filter: Fear and Pretextuality in Mental Disability Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HuM. RTS. 805, 816-19 (1993), Delila M. J. Ledwith, Note, Jones v. Gerhardstein: The
Involuntarily Committed Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment With Antipsychotic
Drugs, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1367, 1373 (1990)).
58. Perlin, supra note 41, at 115 (citing Steven K. Hoge et al., A Prospective,
Multicenter Study of Patients' Refusal of Antipsychotic Medication, 47 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 949 (1990), Shelly Levin et al., A Controlled Comparison of Involuntarily
Hospitalized Medication Refusers and Acceptors, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
161, 169 (1991)).
59. Perlin, supra note 41, at 115-16 (citing Barry Rosenfeld et al., Decision Making in a
Schizophrenic Population, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 651, 660 (1992) (after differences in
verbal functioning controlled, no differences remained between abilities of schizophrenic
patients and nonpatients to consistently weigh risks, benefits and probabilities)); Zito, supra
note 53, at 328, 334.
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which the judicial system enforces this right is not always therapeutic. 60
For example, when judges regularly defer to experts and approve
involuntary treatment, and the patient's counsel is inept, 61 the patient may
perceive that the right to refuse treatment is only illusory.62 When these
kinds of situations occur, not only may patients end up with unwanted
treatment, but they also do not get the therapeutic benefits of having the
right to refuse treatment.
63
One factor that may affect the debate in the future is the advances in
psychopharmacology over the previous decade.64 These new drugs have
60. Perlin, supra note 41, at 116-17.
61. Perlin, supra note 41, at 116-17 (citing Cournos et al., supra note 53 (petition for
involuntary medication granted in 95% contested cases)); Michael G. Farnsworth, The
Impact of Judicial Review of Patients' Refusal to Accept Antipsychotic Medications at the
Minnesota Security Hospital, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 33, 40 (1991);
Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common
Sense, "Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 131 (1991); Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to
Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639 (1992)
(discussing the inappropriate reliance on the professional judgment standard by courts in
"negative rights" claims such as the right to refuse treatment, and the problems of excessive
expert deference); Paul Sauvayre, The Relationship Between the Court and the Doctor on
the Issue of an Inpatient's Refusal of Psychotropic Medication, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 219, 221
(1991) (citing Irwin Hasenfeld and Barbara Grumet, A Study of the Right to Refuse
Treatment, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 65 (1984) (citing studies indicating that
most medication hearings are decided in favor of the physician)); Jorge Veliz and William
James, Medicine Court: Rogers In Practice, 14 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62, 66 (1987) (in 100%
of the cases of involuntary medication studied, the court ruled in favor of medicating the
patient); Joel Haycock et al., Mediating the Gap: Thinking About Alternatives to the Current
Practice of Civil Commitment, 20 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 265, 272 (1994)
(quoting Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the
Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 47 (1993)
("Mental disability law generally regulates powerless individuals represented by passive
counsel in invisible court proceedings conducted by bored or irritated judges")); Michael L.
Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability
Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1992) (on inadequate role of counsel in involuntary
civil commitment cases); Eric Turkheimer & Charles D. H. Parry, Why the Gap? Practice
and Policy in Civil Commitment Hearings, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 646, 650 (1992); Paul S.
Appelbaum and Steven K. Hoge, The Right to Refuse Treatment: What the Research
Reveals, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 279 (1986).
62. Perlin, supra note 41, at 116-17 (citing Lisa A. Callahan, Challenging Mental
Health Law: Butting Heads With a Billygoat, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 305, 313 (1986) (patient
interviews regarding the value of due process procedures used to determine whether a
patient could be involuntarily medicated indicated that many were dissatisfied with the
process and found it to be a sham)).
63. Id.
64. Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the "Chemical Straitjacket": The Legal
Significance of Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 1155 (2002).
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greatly reduced side effects and increased benefits.65 Given that the cases
decided up until the early 1990s focused largely on the horrific side-effects
of antipsychotic therapies, it remains to be seen whether these advances
will lead courts and commentators to re-evaluate the role and value of
66
antipsychotic drugs and the right to refuse treatment.
International Law: The Principles for the Protection of Persons
with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health
Care
International law reflects the struggle between the medical model
adherents and the civil rights adherents. The primary instrument focused
on the rights of persons with a mental illness are the "Principles for the
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental
Health Care" (MI Principles) adopted by General Assembly Resolution in
1991.67 Principle 11 of the MI Principles specifically adopts a right to
informed consent to treatment, which implies the right to refuse or stop
treatment.68 The provision of a right of consent reflects deference to the
civil rights model.
The Principles provide, however, three specific exceptions for when
the requirement of informed consent by the patient may be overridden,
reflecting more of the medical model.69 One exception is for emergency
situations: lack of consent may be disregarded if "a qualified mental health
practitioner authorized by law determines that it is urgently necessary in
order to prevent immediate or imminent harm to the patient or other
persons. 7 °  When a physician gives emergency, compulsory treatment,
however, the "treatment shall not be prolonged beyond the period that is
strictly necessary for this purpose." 71 Consent of the patient is also not
necessary where "the patient has a personal representative empowered by
law to consent to treatment for the patient., 72  Finally, the most
controversial exception allows treatment to be given involuntarily to an
65. Id. at 1154.
66. Idat 1155.
67. Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of
Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 46/119, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 189, U.N.
Doc. A/46/49 (1991) [hereinafter M/ Principles].
68. Id. at Principle 11 ("No treatment shall be given to a patient without his or her
informed consent, except as provided for [below].")
69. Id
70. Id. at Principle 11(8).
71. Id.
72. Id. at Principle 11(7).
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involuntarily hospitalized patient with a mental illness if
(b) an independent authority, having in its possession all relevant
information [required to make an informed consent decision according
to the Principles], is satisfied that, at the relevant time, the patient lacks
the capacity to give or withhold informed consent to the proposed plan
of treatment, or, if domestic legislation provides, that having regard to
the patient's own safety or the safety of others, the patient unreasonably
withholds such consent; and (c) the independent authority is satisfied
that the proposed plan of treatment is in the best interest of the patient's
health needs.
73
If the patient has an authorized representative who does not provide
consent to treatment, however, the representative's refusal may not be
overridden under this last exception.74 There is some deference to the civil
rights viewpoint in requiring incapacity of the patient and an independent
authority to approve the treatment. There is no definition of what
constitutes an independent authority, however, so in practice this protection
may not amount to much and has been one of the primary criticisms of the
MI Principles by civil rights proponents.75
Stressing the importance of the right to consent, however, the
Principles provide that when treatments are authorized without a patient's
informed consent, "every effort shall nevertheless be made to inform the
patient about the nature of the treatment, and any possible alternatives and
to involve the patient as far as practicable in the development of the
treatment plan."76 Furthermore, the MI Principles provide for a right to
appeal any non-consensual treatment.77 The MI Principles also outline
certain treatments that may not be given without consent or under greater
restrictions: sterilization; major medical or surgical procedures;
78psychosurgery; and clinical trials and experimental treatments.
While many in the mental disability rights community consider the MI
Principles to be "core minimum standards under International Human
Rights Law," there have been criticisms, particularly regarding the MI
73. Id. at Principle 11(6).
74. Id. at Principle 11(7).
75. Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J. Sundram, International Human Rights in Mental
Health Legislation, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 469, 475 (2002).
76. Ml Principles, supra note 67, at Principle 11(9).
77. Id at Principle 11(16).
78. Id. at Principle 11(12)-(15).
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Principles' treatment of the right to consent to and refuse treatment. 79 The
criticism comes mainly from the civil rights perspective finding that the MI
Principles promote a medical approach to mental health problems. 80 In one
commentator's view, the MI Principles essentially create a "dichotomous
conception of the protection of the person's rights and freedoms, in which
the right to treatment is set in opposition to other human rights, without
sufficient regard to a patient's own representation of health. 81
Furthermore, the idea that an independent authority can make the decision
for the patient has been criticized by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
disability rights as discriminatory in allowing coercive treatment of a
person with a disability, but not other people.
82
The Right-To-Refuse Treatment Around the World
The debate between the medical model advocates and the civil rights
model advocates has primarily affected North America and Western
Europe. It is in these countries where the civil rights model has had the
most impact. In Asia, developing countries and Eastern Europe, on the
other hand, the medical model dominates due to cultural and economic
reasons. However, as the rights of persons with a mental illness have
become more significant internationally, the debate is moving into these
areas. It remains to be seen what effect it will have.
North America
North American mental health legislation and court decisions reflect
the tension between the medical and the civil rights models.83 In both
Canada and the United States, provincial or state law controls the decisions
to involuntarily detain persons with mental illnesses, although cases
interpreting the U.S. Constitution or Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in relation to these laws provide an overarching framework.84
79. Rosenthal, supra note 75, at 475.
80. Gendreau, supra note 15, at 276.
81. Id.
82. REPORT OF A SEMINAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY HELD AT ALMASA
CONFERENCE CENTRE, STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN, (Marcia Rioux ed., 2000). While this meeting
included representatives of the six major international disability groups, this group of
experts should not be confused with the U.N. Panel of Experts authorized by the U.N.
General Assembly to advise the Special Rapporteur. The report of the conference does not
make specific reference to the resolution adopted by the experts at the meeting.
83. Gupta, supra note 20, at 247.
84. See e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that "at the least,
due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment must bear some reasonable
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The United States
In the United States, states may detain a person with a mental illness
under either their police power or the parens patriae doctrine. 85 Detention
under the police power requires both a finding of mental illness and
dangerousness to self or others, as established in the Lessard v. Schmidt
decision discussed earlier. 86 The basis of the parens patriae doctrine is the
state's interest in caring for an individual who is unable to care for
herself.87 Courts that have upheld the use of the parens patriae doctrine,
however, have generally limited the use of the doctrine to cases where the
person is, in essence, a passive danger to herself, which includes the
incapacity to make a reasonable decision about treatment.88
The sources of most legal and social theories driving the debate in the
area of a right to refuse treatment are two federal trial court opinions:
89
Rennie v. Klein90 and Rogers v. Okin.91  "In Rennie, the district court
decided that, in the absence of an emergency, the right-to-refuse treatment
is grounded on the emerging constitutional right to privacy." 92 In addition,
because of side effects that could include permanent disability, adding
forced medication to involuntary confinement constituted a significant
enough change to the patient's liberty interest to cause procedural rights to
attach. 93 The district court held, however, that there were three factors to
relationship to the purpose for which the individual is committed."); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (holding that because involuntary commitment is a
massive curtailment of liberty, a state cannot constitutionally confine, without more, a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with
the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.)
85. PERLIN 1, supra note 1, § 2A-4.6.
86. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on
procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
87. PERLIN 1, supra note 1, § 2A-4.6.
88. PERLIN 1, supra note 1, § 2A-4.6. For example in Colyar v. Third Judical District
Court, 469 F. Supp. 424, 432, 434 (D. Utah 1979), the federal district court held that to
sustain a parens patriae commitment, the state must show that: 1) the person is mentally ill;
2) she poses an immediate danger to herself, "which may include the inability to provide the
basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter;" and 3) because of her illness,
"the person is unable to make a rational decision about treatment."
89. PERLIN 2, supra note 4, § 3B-5 (2d ed. 1999).
90. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), supplemented, 476 F. Supp. 1294
(D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S.
1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
91. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass 1979), modified, 634 F.2d 650 (1st
Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1984).
92. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1144.
93. Id. at 1147.
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consider in determining if the right could be overridden: 1) whether or not a
patient can be confined without endangering other patients and staff, if she
is refusing medication that would curb her dangerous tendencies; 2)
whether or not the patient is competent to make a decision about drug
refusal; and 3) whether or not there is a less restrictive alternative
available.94 In reaching its decision, the district court "made elaborate fact
findings as to the conditions of the plaintiffs hospitalization, the nature of
psychotropic drugs, their effects and side effects ... , and the plaintiffs
diagnosis and capacity to make decisions with regard to drug use." 95
Not long after the decision in Rennie, the Rogers v. Okin court held
that hospitals could not forcibly medicate voluntarily or involuntarily
detained patients with a mental illness except in cases where there is a
compelling state interest such as an emergency "in which a failure to do so
would bring about a substantial likelihood of physical harm to the patient
,,6or others. To involuntarily medicate absent an emergency would be a
violation of the right of privacy under the First Amendment. 97 The court
also found that while a person involuntarily detained for mental health
reasons did face some "impairment of their relationship to reality," most
are competent to make decisions regarding treatment. 98 On the other hand,
if a patient had been found incompetent in accordance with state law, a
guardian could exercise the consent rights of the patient regarding
treatment absent an emergency. 99 While the appellate courts restricted
these decisions, they agreed with the district courts in three areas:
1) involuntary hospitalization did not equal incompetence; 2) involuntarily
detained patients with a mental illness had a qualified right to refuse
psychotropic or antipsychotic drugs; and 3) some kind of procedural
mechanism taking into account the issue of side effects and other factors
was necessary to ensure effectuation of the right.
100
Since Rennie and Rogers, all states but Utah recognize a right to
refuse treatment separate from the involuntary hospitalization decision for
persons with a mental illness. 10 1 They also recognize that some judicial
procedural protections need to be provided in order to ensure this right with
94. Id. at 1145-46.
95. PERLIN 2, supra note 4, § 3B-5. la (citing Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1136-41).
96. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1368-1371.
97. Id. at 1366-67.
98. Id. at 1361.
99. Id. at 1364.
100. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 843-51; Rogers, 634 F.2d at 656-61.
101. PERLIN 2, supra note 4, § 3B-6.
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some states providing a greater level of protection than other states.'0 2 The
only state that does not provide for a separation of the involuntary
hospitalization and treatment is Utah.10 3 In Utah, however, the state can
only involuntarily hospitalize a person with a mental illness if the court
determines that the person is incompetent to make treatment decisions at
the time of the detention order, thus preventing the need to make such a
decision at the time of the treatment. 0 4
Canada
In Canada, all provinces allow for involuntary hospitalization of
persons with a mental illness if they pose a danger or health risk to
themselves or others and they refuse to be admitted voluntarily.'
0 5
102. Id.
103. UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-631 (2005), available at <www.le.state.ut.us/-code/
TITLE62A/62AOC.htm>.
104. Id.
105. Mental Health Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 288, § 22 (1996) (Can.) [hereinafter BC Mental
Health Act], available at <www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/statM/9628801.htm#section22>
(British Columbia); Mental Health Act, R.S.A., ch. M-13, § 2 (2000) (Can.) [hereinafter
Alberta Mental Health Act], available at <www.canlii.org/ab/laws/sta/m-
13/20050318/whole.html> (Alberta); Mental Health Act, C.C.S.M., ch. Ml10, § 17(1)
(2000) (Can.) [hereinafter Manitoba Mental Health Act], available at
<www.canlii.org/mb/laws/sta/m-110/20050510/whole.html> (Manitoba); Mental Health
Act, R.S.N.B., ch. M-10, § 8(1)(c) (1973) (Can.) [hereinafter New Brunswick Mental Health
Act], available at <www.canlii.org/nb/laws/sta/m-10/20050420/whole.html> (New
Brunswick); Mental Health Act, R.S.N.L., ch. M-9, § 5(1) (1990) (Can.) [hereinafter
Newfoundland and Labrador Mental Health Act], available at
<www.canlii.org/nl/laws/sta/m-9/20050303/whole.html#5> (Newfoundland and Labrador);
Mental Health Act, R.S.N.W.T., ch. M-10, § 13 (1988) (Can.) [hereinafter Northwest
Territories Mental Health Act], available at <www.canlii.org/nt/laws/sta/m-
10/20050211/whole.html> (Northwest Territories); Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S., ch. 208, §
44(2), (3), (4) (1989) (Can.) [hereinafter Nova Scotia Hospitals Act], available at
<www.canlii.org/ns/laws/sta/rl989c.208/20050211/whole.html> (Nova Scotia); Mental
Health Act, R.S.O., ch. M.7, § 20(1.1) (1990) (Can.) [hereinafter Ontario Mental Health
Act], available at <www.canlii.org/on/laws/sta/m-7/20050511/whole.html#BK9> (Ontario
also requires that the individual be incapable of consenting to treatment in order to be
involuntarily hospitalized); Mental Health Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. M-6.1, § 13(1) (1988) (Can.)
[hereinafter Prince Edward Island Mental Health Act], available at
<www.canlii.org/pe/laws/sta/m-6.1/20050419/whole.html> (Prince Edward Island); Civil
Code of Quebec S.Q., ch. 64, §§ 28, 29, 30 (1991), ch. 75, §§ 31, 32, 33 (1997) (Can.)
[hereinafter Quebec Civil Code]; Mental Health Services Act, S.S., ch. M-13.1, § 24.1(1)
(1984-85-86) [hereinafter Saskatchewan Mental Health Services Act], available at
<www.canlii.org/sk/laws/sta/m- 13.1/20050511 /whole.html> (Saskatchewan also requires
that the patient be unable to make an informed decision regarding her care and treatment in
order to be involuntarily admitted.); Mental Health Act, R.S.Y., ch. 150, § 13(1) (2002)
[hereinafter Yukon Mental Health Act], available at <www.canlii.org/yk/laws/sta/150/
20041124/whole.html>.
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Originally, the standard was simply a need for treatment. 106 The impetus
for making the change came about due to two Manitoban court decisions,10 7
Lussa v. Health Science Centre and Director of Psychiatric Service'0 8 and
Thwaites v. Health Sciences Centre Psychiatric Facility.10 9 These cases
established that the criteria for involuntary hospitalization in Manitoba
were too vague and subjective and therefore a violation of the Canadian
Charter." 0
In Lussa, the court found that the patient had been detained for
twenty-one days without opportunity for review because she was "believed
to be mentally disordered and in need of treatment.... ." The court held
that this violated her right to life, liberty and security "except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice," her right not to be arbitrarily
detained, and her right to be notified of her rights upon detention.' In
Thwaites, the court was concerned that "in the absence of objective
standards, the possibility of compulsory examination and detention hangs
over the heads of all persons suffering from a mental disorder, regardless of
the nature of the disorder, and the availability and suitability of alternative
and less restrictive forms of treatment."'" 2 Thus, dangerousness, as an
observable and objectively verifiable standard, became the new criteria for
involuntary hospitalization. 113
In Canada, there is also a general recognition of a right to refuse
treatment.' 14 Replacing the need for treatment standard with the
dangerousness standard "implied that hospitalization was not necessarily a
vehicle to obtain treatment but was for purposes of restraint or social
control.""15 As a result, some provinces began allowing for treatment and
hospitalization as separate entities. 1 6 The first judicial recognition of a
competent involuntary patient's right to refuse treatment came in Fleming
v. Reid, a 1991 case in Ontario. 117 In Reid, an involuntary psychiatric
patient had expressed while he was competent that he did not wish to be
106. Gupta, supra note 20, at 251.
107. Id. at 251-52.
108. Lussa v. Health Science Centre, [1983] CarswellMan 403 (unreported).
109. Thwaites v. Health Sciences Centre Psychiatric Facility [1988] D.L.R. 388.
110. Gupta, supra note 20, at 251-52.
111. Lussa, [1983] CarswellMan 403.
112. Thwaites, [1998] D.L.R. 388.
113. Gupta, supra note 20, at 251-52.
114. Id. at252.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Fleming v. Reid [1991] D.L.R. 298.
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treated with anti-psychotic medications that he had previously taken for
schizophrenia. " 8 The Ontario Court of Appeals found that setting aside the
patient's competently made wishes in favor of the physician's
determination of the patient's present best interest was contrary to his right
to life, liberty, and security as guaranteed under section 7 of the Canadian
Charter.l 9
Currently, three provinces do not allow a right to refuse treatment
once involuntarily hospitalized: Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and
Newfoundland.120  Of these three provinces, however, Saskatchewan
requires a finding of incompetence to make treatment decisions due to the
mental disability before a person with a mental illness may be involuntarily
hospitalized, similar to the legislation found in Utah.' 2  In this way, the
law ensures that the government may only use hospitalization as a vehicle
for treatment, and not to detain for socially undesirable behavior. 22 British
Columbia and Newfoundland, on the other hand, recognize a right to refuse
treatment, but a physician may override the patient's decision and treat her
anyway in order to ensure that involuntary hospitalization is for treatment
only.
123
In the other seven provinces, a physician evaluates the patient's
capacity to consent to treatment. 124  If the patient is found capable, her
decision must be respected.125 If the patient is found incapable, however, a
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. BC Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 22; Newfoundland and Labrador
Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 5(1); Saskatchewan Mental Health Services Act,
supra note 105, at § 24.1(1).
121. Saskatchewan Mental Health Services Act, supra note 105, at § 24.1(1).
122. Gupta, supra note 20, at 259.
123. BC Mental Health Act supra note 105, at § 31; Newfoundland and Labrador Mental
Health Act, surpa note 105, at § 6(3).
124. Alberta Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 27; Manitoba Mental Health Act,
supra note 105, at § 27; New Brunswick Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 8.0(1);
Northwest Territories Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 19.1(1); Nova Scotia
Hospitals Act, supra note 105, at § 52(1); Health Care Consent Act, S.O., ch. 2, Sched. A., §
10 (1) (1996) [hereinafter Ontario Health Care Consent Act], available at <www.e-
laws.gov.on.caiDBLaws/Statutes/English/96hO2_e.htm>; Ontario Mental Health Act, supra
note 105, at § 20(1.1); Prince Edward Island Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 23(3);
Quebec Civil Code supra note 105, at § 11; Yukon Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at §
20.
125. Alberta Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 29; Manitoba Mental Health Act,
supra note 105, at §§ 26, 29(l)(a); New Brunswick Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at §
8.4(1); Northwest Territories Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 21; Nova Scotia
Hospitals Act, supra note 105, at §§ 54(1), 56, 57; Ontario Health Care Consent Act, supra
note 124, at § 10(1); Prince Edward Island Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 23(1);
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substitute decision maker is appointed. 26  The patient can challenge an
incapability finding first in a non-judicial review process and later through
the courts. 27 In six of the provinces and territories, if a review board finds
the patient capable, the physician cannot then override the patient's
wishes. 128 In three other provinces and territories, if a review board finds
the patient capable, the physician can still apply to override the capable
patient's decision. 129  Finally, in all provinces, there are provisions for
emergency treatment without consent if a patient is mentally incapable and
has not expressed prior wishes concerning treatment. 130
Western Europe
Similar to North America, there are currently no European-wide
regulations on the involuntary detention of persons with a mental illness,13 1
although some recommendations are under consideration by the Council of
Europe, 132 and the European Union commissioned a study of the issue.
33
Quebec Civil Code, supra note 105, at § 11; Yukon Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at §
21(2).
126. Alberta Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 28; Manitoba Mental Health Act,
supra note 105, at § 28; New Brunswick Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 8.6;
Northwest Territories Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at §§ 19.1(3)(c), 19.2, 19.5; Nova
Scotia Hospitals Act, supra note 105, at § 54(2); Ontario Health Care Consent Act, supra
note 124, at § 20 (1); Prince Edward Island Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 23(6);
Quebec Civil Code, supra note 105, at §§ 11, 15; Yukon Mental Health Act, supra note 105,
at §§ 21(2), 22.
127. Alberta Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at §§ 27(3), (29), (43); Manitoba
Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at §§ 50(l)(b), 56(2), 59(1); New Brunswick Mental
Health Act, supra note 105, at § 8.4(4); Northwest Territories Mental Health Act, supra note
105, at §§ 19.1(3)(b), 26.1(1), 29; Nova Scotia Hospitals Act, supra note 105, at § 58;
Ontario Health Care Consent Act, supra note 124, at § 32(1); Prince Edward Island Mental
Health Act, supra note 105, at §§ 23(5), 28(l)(e), 29(12); Quebec Civil Code, supra note
105, at § 16; Yukon Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at §§ 20(3), 31(1), 37(1).
128. Alberta Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 29; Manitoba Mental Health Act,
supra note 105, at §§ 29(1)(a), 30(1); Northwest Territories Mental Health Act, supra note
105, at §§ 20, 21; Nova Scotia Hospitals Act, supra note 105, at § 58(6); Ontario Health
Care Consent Act, supra note 105, at § 10(2); Quebec Civil Code supra note 105, at § 16.
129. New Brunswick Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at §§ 8.4(2), 30.1; Prince
Edward Island Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at §§ 24, 28(2)(a); Yukon Mental Health
Act, supra note 105, at § 23.
130. Alberta Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at §§ 4, 30;. Manitoba Mental Health
Act, supra note 105, at § 29(2), (5); New Brunswick Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at
§ 8.4(3), 8.4(9); Northwest Territories Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 20; Nova
Scotia Hospitals Act, supra note 104, at § 9(1); Ontario Health Care Consent Act, supra
note 124, at §§ 5, 25; Prince Edward Island Mental Health Act, supra note 105, at § 23(11);
Quebec Civil Code, supra note 105, at § 13.
131. Salize, supra note 14.
132. See infra notes 212-217 and accompanying text.
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Thus, each country in Western Europe 34 determines its own regulations for
the involuntary detention of persons with mental illness, and in some
countries, regulation is at the state level. 135  Nonetheless, they are all
subject to the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms 136 (European Convention).
The European Court of Human Rights has heard only one case
involving the forced medication of an involuntarily detained person with a
mental illness. 137 The European Court in Herczegfalvy v. Austria did not
find the forced treatment to be a violation of either his right to be free from
inhuman or degrading treatment or his right to privacy under the European
Convention and granted tremendous deference to the opinions of medical
authorities. 138 The opinion, however, recognized the possibility that the
outcome might be different if the involuntarily hospitalized person could
show that she was capable of making treatment decisions for herself.
139
Furthermore, the opinion does not allow courts to escape their duties in
protecting the rights of persons with mental disabilities confined in
psychiatric hospitals. Courts must ensure that there is, at least, medical
necessity for the treatment to ensure that it does not rise to the level of
133. Salize, supra note 14.
134. For purposes of this paper, Western European countries include: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Portugal, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (England and Wales).
135. Salize, supra note 14.
136. [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, as amended by Protocols
Nos. 3, 5, 8, and II which entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971,
1 January 1990, and 1 November 1998 respectively [hereinafter European Convention].
137. Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 437 (1993).
138. Id. at §§ 82, 83 & 86.
139. The language of the court's opinion acknowledges an assumption that an
involuntarily hospitalized person with a mental illness was not capable of making a decision
regarding treatment and grants deference to medical authorities finding that "as a general
rule, a measure which is a therapeutic necessity cannot be regarded as inhuman or
degrading." Id. at § 82. Yet, the court also indicates that the outcome might be different if
the person could show that she was capable of making such treatment decisions. First,
regarding their finding that there was no violation of the patient's right to be treated
humanely, the deference that it expressed to the decisions of medical authorities to decide
"on the basis of the recognized rules of medical science, on the therapeutic methods to be
used, if necessary by force, to preserve the physical and mental health of patients" applies
specifically to patients "who are entirely incapable of deciding for themselves and for whom
they are therefore responsible." Id. Furthermore, the court stated that of particular
importance in their decision finding no violation of the applicant's privacy was a lack of
specific information showing why the hospital authorities were not entitled "to regard the
applicant's psychiatric illness as rendering him entirely incapable of taking decisions for
himself." Id. at § 86.
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inhuman or degrading treatment. 40 In these aspects, the court's decision
seems to somewhat correspond with the idea of therapeutic jurisprudence.
There is no indication in the English language literature that the European
Court's decision in Herczegfalvy has had an effect on the right to refuse
treatment among member countries, however.
The laws of the Western European countries reflect the tension
between the medical model and the civil rights model. A study
commissioned by the European Union concluded that there was no one
influence on member states' regulations for involuntary hospitalization and
treatment. 141  Instead, legal frameworks or practice are determined by
"national legal traditions, structures or standards of quality with regard to
the provision of general health care, as well as national approaches or
philosophies regarding mental health care. 142
There are essentially five variations on who can be involuntarily
hospitalized. Austria,143 Belgium, 144 France,145 Germany,1
46 Luxembourg, 147
and the Netherlands 148 require both the presence of a mental disorder and
140. The court acknowledged "the position of inferiority and powerlessness which is
typical of patients confined in psychiatric hospitals, call[ing] for increased vigilance in
reviewing whether the Convention has been complied with." Id. at § 82. Furthermore, the
court recognized the necessity of a court satisfying for "itself that the medical necessity has
been convincingly shown to exist," which it found to exist in this case. Id
141. Salize, supra note 14, at 155.
142. Id. at 148.
143. Salize, supra note 14, at 46-47 (citing the 1990 Anhalterecht (commitment law)
(Austria)).
144. Loi du 26 juin 1990, Art. 2 (published in Staatsblad of July 27, 1990, page 14806)
(Belgium), available at <www3.dekamer.be/digidoc/DPS/K2050/K20502646/
K20502646.pdf>. See also Salize, supra note 14, at 51.
145. Loi No. 90-527 du 27 juin 1990 (JORF du 30 juin 1990), Art. L-333 (France),
available at <www.legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/SPEBG.htm>. See also Salize, supra
note 14, at 75. France's law is somewhat ambiguous so in practice it may only require a
need for treatment, and not dangerousness. ("The person's state requires immediate care
along with constant supervision in a hospital environment." Loi No. 90-527 du 27 juin
1990.)
146. Salize, supra note 14, at 82-86. In Germany, involuntary commitment is regulated
by states.
147. Loi du 26 mai 1988 relative au placement des personnes atteintes de troubles
mentaux dans des dtablissements ou services psychiatriques ferm~s, art. 2 (published in
Memorial 028 du 16.06.1988, p. 560) (Luxembourg), available at
<www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/1988/0281606/0281606.pdf7SID=d5cad3e 15Oe5122
39f96dcef5b207e22#page=2> modified by Loi du 8 aofit 2000 portant modification, art. 3, §
2 (published in Memorial 095 du 07.09.2000), available at
<www.legilux.public.luIleg/a/archives/2000/0950709/0950709.pdf#page=2>. See also
Salize, supra note 14, at 111.
148. Salize, supra note 14, at 117 (citing the Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory
Admissions) Act (17 January 1994) (the Netherlands)).
[Vol. 29:2
A Comparative Look at the Right to Refuse Treatment
dangerousness in order for a person to be involuntarily detained. Italy, 149
Spain, 150 and Sweden' 51 require a mental disorder and a need for treatment.
Denmark, 152 Finland, 53 Greece, 154 Ireland, 55 and Portugal, 56 allow the
involuntary detention of a person with a mental disorder under either a
dangerousness or need for treatment standard. 57 Scotland 58 and England
and Wales 159 require both a need for treatment in a hospital and
dangerousness. Scotland,160 Spain, 16' and France 162 additionally require
that the person to be hospitalized be incompetent to make decisions
regarding her treatment due to the mental illness. The differences among
the countries are greater than they appear, however, as the definition of a
mental disorder varies greatly among the countries, 1
63
Differences in the legislation and practice of Western European
countries are even more prominent regarding the right to consent to or
refuse treatment. Legislation is not always an accurate indicator of whether
149. Salize, supra note 14, at 103 (citing Law 833/1978 (Health Reform Text) and Law
180/78 (Basaglia law) (Italy)).
150. Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil [L.E. CIv.] arts. 758-63 (Madrid 2000).
151. Salize, supra note 14, at 134 (citing the Compulsory Psychiatric Care Act (LPT
1991:1128) and the Forensic Psychiatric Care Act (LRV1991:1472) of January 1 1992
(Sweden)).
152. Salize, supra note 14, at 60 (citing the Danish Psychiatric Care Act (1989 revised
1998) (Denmark)).
153. Salize, supra note 14, at 65 (citing the Mental Health Act (1116/1990) passed in
1991 (Finland)).
154. Salize, supra note 14, at 88 (citing Law 2071/92 entitled "Modemisation and
Organisation of the Health System," arts. 94-100, Law 2716/1999 entitled "Development
and Modernisation of Mental Health Services," and the explanatory instruction of the
504/1996 interpretative circular of the General Attorney of the Supreme Court of Appeal
(Greece)).
155. Mental Health Act 2001, §§ 3, 8, available at
<www.irishstatutebook.ie/ZZA25Y2001.html>. See also Salize, supra note 14, at 97.
156. Salize, supra note 14, at 123 (citing Lei de Safide Mental n036/98 (The Mental
Health Act)). In: Didrio da Repfiblica, I Sdrie A - n' 169; 24/7/98 Imprensa Nacional,
Lisbon (Portugal).
157. Salize, supra note 14, at 22.
158. Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, § 44, available at
<www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2003/20030013.htm>.
159. Mental Health Act 1983, § 2 (England and Wales). See also Salize, supra note 14,
at 139. Under the 2004 Draft Mental Health Act, if passed, these requirements will
essentially change to a requirement of a mental disorder and dangerousness due to a broad
definition of treatment. 2004 Draft Mental Health Act § 2 & 19 (England and Wales).
160. Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, § 44.
161. L.E.CIv., supra note 149.
162. Loi No. 90-527 du 27 juin 1990 (JORF du 30 juin 1990), Art. L-333 (France). See
also Salize, supra note 14, at 75.
163. Salize, supra note 14.
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or not such a right exists in practice. 164 Sweden, 6 5 Denmark, 66 and
Luxembourg 167 all provide for separate modalities of involuntary
hospitalization and treatment under the law, but in practice it is not possible
to have placement without treatment in these countries. 68 For example, in
Denmark the law separates compulsory hospitalization and compulsory
treatment, but consent is not an absolute requirement for either and the
requirements for one are the requirements for the other.' 69  Although a
psychiatrist must always make efforts to persuade the patient to consent,
consent is deemed given if the patient neither verbally nor behaviorally
protests. 
70
Luxembourg and Sweden have a requirement of consent for
involuntary treatment, but physicians may override the patient's
decision. 17 1 In Sweden, this apparent inconsistency might be explained by
the purpose of the hospitalization according to the Laws of Compulsory
Admission and Involuntary Treatment: "to get the patient into a condition
which makes it possible for him/her to participate in voluntary treatment
settings." 172 In essence, this purpose makes it impossible in practice for an
involuntary patient to refuse treatment. 73  The law provides some
protection, however, in that decisions to use involuntary treatment must be
preceded by less restrictive measures and must be reported to the National
Board of Health and Welfare. 174  In Luxembourg, on the other hand,
physicians do not need to justify involuntary treatment and are essentially
left alone in their decisions regarding maintenance. 175
Ireland is similar to Luxembourg and Sweden in that separate
modalities of involuntary hospitalization and treatment exist under the law,
164. Id. at 29.
165. Salize, supra note 14, at 134 (citing the Compulsory Psychiatric Care Act (LPT
1991:1128) and the Forensic Psychiatric Care Act (LRV1991:1472) of January 1 1992
(Sweden)).
166. Salize, supra note 14, at 60 (citing the Danish Psychiatric Care Act (1989 revised
1998) (Denmark)).
167. Loi du 26 mai 1988 relative au placement des personnes atteintes de troubles
mentaux dans des 6tablissements ou services psychiatriques ferm6s, art. 4, 31 (Luxemburg)
See also Salize, supra note 14, at 111.
168. Salize, supra note 14, at 29.
169. Id. at 60, 62.
170. Id. at 61.
171. Id. at 29, 113, 136.
172. Id. at 136.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 113.
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but it is unclear if it is possible in practice to have involuntary
hospitalization without treatment, as physicians may override the patient's
decision to withhold consent. 
176
Similarly, in the United Kingdom (England and Wales), legislation
provides for a distinction between involuntary hospitalization and
treatment, 177 but the law allows for compulsory treatment for up to three
months if a physician believes it is necessary, after which the approval of a
second doctor is required. 178 Unlike Sweden, Denmark, and Luxembourg,
however, in practice it is possible to be involuntarily hospitalized without
treatment. 179 The United Kingdom has proposed changes to their mental
health system, however. Under the 2004 Draft Mental Health Bill, there is
no distinction between involuntary hospitalization and treatment although a
treatment care plan for each patient must be drawn up within five days of
admission and approved by a newly established mental health tribunal. 8 '
While the patient is to be consulted, there is no provision requiring
informed consent of the patient for the care plan to be administered.'
8
'
Furthermore, under the 2004 Draft Mental Health Bill, it will be possible to
involuntarily hospitalize patients over the age of 16 for whom no treatment
is available if they pose a threat of harm to others. 82 The Department of
Health has explained the reasoning for not allowing persons with capacity
to refuse treatment as a matter of public safety and because it would
deprive criminal offenders with mental disabilities the opportunity of
diversion from the criminal system to the mental health system.
83
Scotland has the most civil rights oriented laws of all of the mental
health laws in Western Europe. Passed in March 2003 and entering into
effect in April 2005, Scottish law does not allow compulsory treatment
simply based on involuntary hospitalization, which requires a showing of
incapacity, but rather requires a separate compulsory treatment order
approved by a mental health tribunal. 84 A compulsory treatment order
176. Mental Health Act 2001, § 57 (Ireland).
177. Mental Health Act 1983, §§ 2, 3 (England and Wales)
178. Mental Health Act 1983, § 58. See also Salize, supra note 14, at 29, 141, 143.
179. Salize, supra note 14, at 29.
180. Draft Mental Health Bill (2004), § 31 (England and Wales), available at
<www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/08/89/14/04088914.pdf>.
181. Draft Mental Health Bill (2004), § 31.
182. Draft Mental Health Bill (2004), § 9.
183. Department of Health, Frequently Asked Questions at <www.dh.gov.uk/
PolicyAndGuidance/HealthAndSocialCareTopics/MentalHealth/MentalHealthArticle/fs/en?
CONTENT ID=4084647&chk=Ivlhul> (visited June 10, 2005).
184. Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, Part 7; SANDRA
MCDOUGALL, SCOTTISH ASSOCIATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH, THE NEW MENTAL HEALTH
2006]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
may only be issued based on a proposed care plan and after hearing from
the patient. 185 As the Scottish law has only come into practice in April
2005 it is unclear how this act will function in practice.
Behind Scotland in following the civil rights model are Spain and
France. In Spain, there is no specific national mental health law.1
8 6
Therefore, the law regulates the rights of persons with a mental illness
together with the rights of other types of patients. 187 Although the law
recognizes a right to refuse treatment, it does not recognize such a right
where the person is not capable of making decisions. 8 8 Under Spanish
law, however, a person must be found incompetent to make decisions in
order to be involuntarily hospitalized, and thus there is no right to refuse
treatment once a person has already been committed. 89 France does have
specific mental health legislation and does not provide for hospitalization
without treatment. 190 As with Spain, however, a requirement that the
person be incapable of providing consent in order to be hospitalized may
make the issue of consent moot once the individual is already in the
hospital. 191
While not reaching the level of Scotland, Spain, and France in regard
to involuntary hospitalization, Germany and the Netherlands are both more
civil rights oriented than most of the rest of the Western European
countries when it comes to compulsory treatment. In Germany, however,
because individual states determine the regulations, their laws are
somewhat heterogeneous.' 92 Generally, state commitment laws recognize a
difference between involuntary hospitalization and treatment, and Federal
law requires consent for treatment.' 93 A Constitutional Court of Germany
decision confirming a "right to be ill," exempting society at large from the
ACT, WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT (2005), available at <www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/
health/nnha-00.asp>.
185. Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, § 63,64.
186. L.E.CIV., supra note 149. See also Salize, supra note 14, at 131.
187. Id
188. Ley 14/1986 del 25 de Abril de "General de Sanidad" Madrid 1986, art. 10 (Spain).
See also Salize, supra note 14, at 131.
189. L.E.CIV., supra note 150. ("The admission due to a psychological disturbance of a
person who is not able to consent, even if he or she is under guardianship, will need judicial
authorization .... ). See also Salize, supra note 14, at 132.
190. Loi No. 90-527 du 27juin 1990 (JORF du 30juin 1990), Art. L-326, L-333 modifid
par Loi n'90-527 du 27 juin 1990 art. 3 (JORF 30 juin 1990) (France). See also Salize,
supra note 14, at 75.
191. Id.
192. Salize, supra note 14, at 82.
193. Id. at 83.
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responsibility of improving the situation of other citizens by "infringing
upon their personal freedoms," supports a right to refuse treatment.1 94
Some states allow for involuntary treatment in cases of emergency with
some limiting the emergency to cases that are life threatening, and some to
cases where the life of another person is in danger. 195 Other states require
immediate notification of a lawyer or a court when involuntary treatment is
given. 196 There is, however, one state that allows compulsory treatment for
any involuntarily hospitalized person despite the fact that its Higher
Regional Court has said that treatment may not be forced against the
person's will.'
97
The Netherlands' legislation regulating involuntary hospitalization
and treatment, the Psychiatric Hospitals (Admissions) Act, includes both a
right to informed consent and a process for determining when a patient is
incompetent to make decisions.' 98  Under the Medical Treatment
Agreement Act, however, a physician may override the wishes of a
temporarily incompetent patient when the physician believes that a failure
to intervene will lead to a severe worsening of the patient's medical
condition. 99  Nonetheless, almost all restrictive medical decisions,
including finding the person incompetent, may be appealed by the patient
200or his legal aid through either a complaint procedure or a court.
Finland,20 1 Belgium 2°2 and Portugal2 3 fall on the other end of the
spectrum under the medical model. Legislation in these countries does not
differentiate between involuntary hospitalization and involuntary treatment,
nor are they differentiated in practice.2°4 In Finland, the Mental Health Act
does not distinguish between the two because a person can only be
admitted to a psychiatric hospital in order to receive treatment. 205 Although
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 83-84.
197. Id.
198. Salize, supra note 14, at 117-18 citing the Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory
Admissions) Act (17 January 1994) (Netherlands).
199. Salize, supra note 14, at 118.
200. Id. at 121.
201. Salize, supra note 14, at 65, 68 citing the Mental Health Act (1116/1990) (passed in
1991) and the Patients' Rights Act (passed in 1993) (Finland).
202. Loi du 26juin 1990, Art. 15 (Belgium).
203. Salize, supra note 14, at 123, 26 citing Lei de Saiide Mental n036/98 (The Mental
Health Act). In: Didrio da Rep6blica, I S6rie A - no 169; 24/7/98. Imprensa Nacional,
Lisbon (Portugal).
204. Salize, supra note 14, at 69, 76, 126.
205. Id. at 69.
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the Patients' Rights Act guarantees the right to treatment, self-
determination, and information, a person detained for a mental illness
cannot refuse treatment whether or not she is competent.2 °6  Finland's
arguments for this position correspond with the arguments of the medical
model: the failure to treat is neglecting the needs of a vulnerable person
who is unable to ask for help; and that physical freedom is meaningless
without freedom from the illness.20 7 The remaining countries of Western
Europe fall in the middle of the spectrum between the medical and civil
rights models. Legislation in Italy does not provide any distinction
between involuntary hospitalization and involuntary treatment.
208
Involuntary treatments, however, are to be authorized by law and only used
as "an extreme solution to be adopted only once all other means of
obtaining consent have been attempted," and where there is not time to
adequately put in place outpatient treatment.0 9 In practice, however it does
not seem to always be the case that it is used as a last resort. 21 Austrian
law requires informed consent for treatment and it is possible to be
involuntarily hospitalized without receiving treatment, but consent is not
always required in practice.21'
It is possible that these disparities between the various Western
European countries could narrow in the near future. 212 The Council of
Europe is considering adopting the recommendations of the Working Party
on Human Rights in Psychiatry.21 3 The European Council of Ministers
appointed the Working Party in 1996 to develop recommendations "to
ensure the protection of the human rights and dignity of people with mental
disorder[s], especially those placed as involuntary patients in a psychiatric
establishment., 21 4  The final recommendations include a definition of
206. Id. at 72.
207. Ridttakerttu Kaltiala-Heino & Maritta Valimaki, Involuntary Commitment in Health
Care: An Analysis of the Status and Rights of Involuntarily Treated Psychiatric Patients in
Comparison with Patients Treated Involuntarily Under Other Acts, 8 EUR. J. HEALTH L.
299, 310 (2001).
208. Salize, supra note 14, at 103, 107 citing Law 833/1978 (Health Reform Text) and
Law 180/78 (Basaglia law) (Italy).
209. Salize, supra note 14, at 104.
210. Salize, supra note 14, at 106.
211. Salize, supra note 14, at 29, 47 citing the 1990 Anhalterecht (commitment law)
(Austria).
212. David Kingdon, Roland Jones, Jouko Lrnnqvist, Protecting the Human Rights of
People With Mental Disorder: New Recommendations Emerging From the Council of
Europe, 185 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 277,277 (2004).
213. Id.
214. Id.
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mental disorder that references international classification systems, and
suggest that involuntary hospitalization occur only if there is a mental
disorder that "represents a significant risk of serious harm to self or
others. 21 5  The recommendations further stipulate that patients'
competency to make decisions regarding their treatment should be assumed
even after involuntary hospitalization unless the patient demonstrates
216incompetence. As the Council of Europe has not yet adopted the
recommendations, however, it remains to be seen what kind of impact they
217
will have upon the member countries.
Asia
Laws regulating involuntary hospitalization and treatment of persons
with a mental illness in Asian countries are firmly rooted in the medical
model and, in fact, Japan was a strong advocate for the medical model
during the development of the MI Principles.1 8 Their grounding comes
from having an "authoritative culture" where "the medical profession has
an unquestionable right over the consumer. 2 19 In Japan, for example,
informed consent for cancer treatment has only become a social issue in the
last ten years.220 In addition, Asian culture places a significant emphasis on
the community more than on the individual,221 meaning that the right to
privacy is not very significant.222 One result of this community orientation
is that Japanese law allows for hospitalization by the consent of family
members.223
In China, family is considered to be the most cohesive unit in the
society and the tendency is to place family honor, continuation, prosperity,
and stability ahead of the individual. 4 Traditionally, the belief is that the
presence of a mental illness indicates that a related family member did
215. Id. at 277-78.
216. Id. at 278.
217. Id. at279.
218. Gendreau, supra note 15, at 269.
219. Naotaka Shinfuku, Mental Health Services in Asia: International Perspective and
Challenge for the Coming Years, 52 PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSC1ENCES 269, 273
(1998).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Sharma, Human Rights in Psychiatric Care: An Asian Perspective, 101 ACTA
PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVIA Supplement 97, 101 (2000).
223. Shinfuku, supra note 219, at 273.
224. Kam-shing Yip, Family Caregiving of Clients with Mental Illness in The People's
Republic of China, 9 INT'L. J. OF PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION 19 (2005), available at
<www.psychosocial.comIJPR_9/FamilyCaregivinginChina.html>.
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something immoral in this or a past life and thus, family members may be
afraid to disclose the illness to prevent bringing shame upon the family.
225
Combining these factors with the low governmental investment in mental
health care, over 90% of persons with severe mental disabilities live with
their families as opposed to only 40% in the United States.226 Of those
patients in hospitals, most are in private hospitals paid for by their families,
although they may be there involuntarily. 227 Thus, concerns about a right
to refuse treatment when involuntarily hospitalized are issues for very few
people with a mental illness. There have been accusations about the use of
psychological hospitals to confine dissidents, but to date there is little
evidence to substantiate these claims.228  The little psychiatric
hospitalization that exists, however, has primarily focused on public safety
and social control and little on patients' rights.229 Thus, there is no clear
policy to prevent abuse of involuntary commitment or a right to refuse
treatment.23°
Developing Countries, Eastern and Central Europe, and Asia:
The Impact of Culture and Economics
Based on limited material written about developing and Eastern and
Central European countries, it appears that these countries fall under the
medical model, largely due to family and community oriented cultures and
a lack of resources for mental health care and protection of individual
rights. In many developing countries, local healing systems, which include
popular and folk healers, a variety of non-physician personnel, and
families, provide the vast majority of care and support for persons with
mental illnesses.23' In these cases, concerns about involuntary
hospitalization and the right to refuse treatment are not raised in the way
that proponents of the medical and civil rights models conceive them
because they do not exist. 232  Nonetheless, most, if not all, of these
225. Id.
226. Id, Doris F. Chang & Arthur Kleinman, Growing Pains: Mental Health Care in a
Developing China, 1 THE YALE-CHINA HEALTH J. 85, 86, 87 (2002).
227. Id. at 87, 90.
228. Id. at 92.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. ROBERT DESJARLAIS, ET AL., WORLD MENTAL HEALTH: PROBLEMS AND PRIORITIES
IN Low-INCOME COUNTRIES 54 (1995).
232. A. Alem, Human Rights and Psychiatric Care in Africa with Particular Reference
to the Ethiopian Situation, 101 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 93, 93-4 (2000).
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countries have some type of formal sector.233
In the formal sector, it is questionable whether some of these countries
meet the standard of the medical model, as involuntary hospitalization and
treatment do not always correlate.23' Frequently detention in mental
hospitals is not limited to persons with mental illnesses and, due to scarce
resources, options for treatment are limited with some facilities simply
trying to make do with what they have.235 Nonetheless, as mental health
takes on greater importance in the international arena, the debate is likely to
become more prominent in these countries. 236 The development of the MI
Principles is one example where the debate is extending beyond North
America and Western Europe. Watchdog groups such as Mental Disability
Rights International (MDRI), who aim to protect the rights of persons with
mental disabilities, use these Principles to bring the international debate to
the local communities.
237
Reliance on the family, which is often necessary when faced with a
shortage of mental health resources, is one area where countries are
beginning to feel the impact of the debate over the two medical models.
238
One commentator in Ethiopia expressed the belief that trying to sever the
rights of the person with a mental illness from the family would leave the
person without any support.239 In India, family members are intimately
involved in the patient's mental health care and even reside with the
hospitalized patient.24 ° Indian cultural understandings dictate that someone
other than the person who is sick must make decisions about the person's
care. 241 Therefore, once a person is found to be sick, a family member is
chosen to be responsible for the person's care.242 Due to a shortage of
nurses, the family member fulfills the duties that a nurse ordinarily would:
looking after the patient's hygiene; cooking meals; ensuring the patient
doesn't run away; taking the patient to her therapy sessions; making sure
that the patient takes her medications; and keeping the doctor up to date on
any changes.243 Such intimate family involvement also has the benefits of
233. DESJARLAIS, supra note 231.
234. See infra pp. 185-87.
235. Id.
236. DESJARLAIS, supra note 231, at vii.
237. See Mental Disability Rights International at <www.MDRI.org>.
238. Shinfuku, supra note 219, at 273.
239. Alem, supra note 232, at 95.
240. DESJARLAIS, supra note 231, at 66.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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providing the patient with social and emotional support and acting as a link
between the patient and the outside world.244 Furthermore, by keeping the
patient tied to her social roots, she often has an easier time adjusting to
non-hospital life once the hospital releases her.245
Despite these benefits, there are problems.246 For example, in Peru,
while the law establishes the right to informed consent,247 the consent of
family members is sufficient, and, in fact, often the physicians give more
24credence to what the family says than to the patient. 48 Unfortunately, this
may lead to situations such as that of a sixteen-year old woman who
complained about sexual abuse by her grandfather. 249 Because her family
members did not believe her, they authorized electro-convulsive therapy,
which the hospital gave her.25°
Precisely because of such dangers and because of an emphasis on
equality, organizations such as MDRI oppose the practice of the consent of
family members taking the place of consent of the patient. 251 They contend
that from a human rights perspective, while it is acceptable for an
individual to rely on family members for support in making treatment
decisions, it should be the individual's desire that prevails. 25 2  The MI
Principles reinforce this position in that they are clear that decisions are to
be made by the patient herself and no provision is made for decisions by
family members unless they are appointed as official guardians.253
Africa
Africa has particular difficulty in caring for persons with mental
illness and relies extensively on families and social healers, particularly in
rural areas.254 Some countries have no mental health legislation other than
some articles in their criminal and civil codes regarding the treatment of
244. Id.
245. Id
246. Id.
247. Article 15 of Peru's general health law No. 26842 provides that consumers of health
services have the right "to be informed of all the necessary information to ensure informed
consent, before any procedure or treatment, as well as the ight to deny such treatment." See
MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL & ASOCIACION POR DERECHOS HUMANOS,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH IN PERU 12 (2004) [hereinafter PERU REPORT].
248. Id. at 13.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. MI Principles, supra note 67.
254. Alem, supra note 232, at 94.
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persons with a mental illness when they have committed crimes, and
concerning the protection of their property.2s5 Thus, there is a belief that
"the right of a psychiatric patient to receive modem treatment to alleviate
suffering is not something within the capacity of most African
countries.,
256
In Ethiopia, for example, there is no mental health legislation and
involuntary hospitalization and treatment only requires informed consent
from the escort bringing the individual to the hospital.257 The escort may
258be a family member, a friend, a co-worker, or a police officer. One
commentator's perspective is that while the procedures in place may be
seen as abusive or infringing on basic civil rights, they have protected
many people "from vagrancy and the danger of deterioration, which could
arise from lack of treatment."
259
Latin America
In a World Health Organization study of Costa Rica, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Panama, researchers found that in practice most
compulsory psychiatric hospitalizations had no approval by a judge
regardless of the laws of the country and that no patient was entitled to
refuse treatment.260  These findings are consistent with MDRI's reports
investigating other countries in Latin America. In Mexico, for example,
MDRI found that once a person was placed in a mental health institution,
the director of the facility would make all decisions on the patient's behalf
as her legal guardian.
261
In Uruguay, the law limits involuntary detention in a mental health
facility to persons with a mental illness, 262 but the law provides no
definition of mental illness and detention in such a facility extends to many
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 95.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 96.
260. I. Levav, R. Gonzdlez Uzcdtegui, Rights of Persons With Mental Illness in Central
America, 101 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 83, 85 (2000).
261. MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL
HEALTH: MEXICO, IX (2000).
262. Law of Assistance to Psychopaths 9.581, article 15, IELSUR (1992) at 17-18
("Commitment by medical order, meaning involuntary commitment, shall only be for
treatment purposes and never be the deprivation of liberty for punitive purposes."). See also
MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH
URUGUAY 20 (1995) [hereinafter URUGUAY REPORT].
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people without a mental illness. 263 Furthermore, in the facilities that MDRI
inspected, the staff reported that they did not provide information regarding
treatment to patients, nor was there a system to establish informed
consent.264  In fact, at one hospital, the staff believed that informing
patients about their treatment would be logistically difficult and would
actually worsen the patients' conditions. 265  At another hospital, staff
reported having standing orders to provide psychotropic medication to
patients who refuse medication or become aggressive or unruly.266 No
consent was required, nor was the approval of physicians unless the
treatment extended beyond a day or two. 2 6 7 Nonetheless, MDRI did find
some psychiatrists who made efforts to inform patients about their
treatments in Uruguay.268
Central and Eastern Europe
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe face some similar problems
to those problems found in developing countries, but all of them have
domestic mental health legislation regulating psychiatric detention.269
Generally, the requirements for detention are that the person has a mental
disability of "such nature or degree that s/he needs to be detained and
treated as an inpatient., 270  For example, in Hungary, requirements for
involuntary hospitalization include that the person is diagnosed as mentally
ill and constitutes an immediate and serious danger to herself or others or is
in urgent need of treatment.27' The standard for determining dangerousness
or urgent need is, however, open to broad interpretation.
272
Unfortunately, emergency procedures provide fewer protections and
are used more often than non-emergency procedures, leaving room for
263. URUGUAY REPORT, supra note 262, at 20.
264. Id. at 41.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Oliver Lewis, Mental Disability Law in Central and Eastern Europe: Paper,
Practice, Promise, 8 J. MENTAL HEALTH L. 293, 295 (2002).
270. Id.
271. Health Act of 1972, amendment no. LXXXVII/1994 (Dec. 22, 1994), entered into
force February 1995, '35(5) (urgent commitment), '35/A(3) (involuntary commitment)
(Hungary). See also MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
MENTAL HEALTH: HUNGARY 76 (1997) [hereinafter HUNGARY REPORT].
272. Health Act of 1972, amendment no. LXXXVII/1994 (Dec. 22, 1994), 35(5)
(commitment on the basis of urgent need) (Hungary). See also HUNGARY REPORT, supra
note 271, at 77 n. 225.
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abuse.2 73 As a result, there are concerns about the possibility of involuntary
detention and treatment based on the decision of a single doctor, an irritated
family member, or police taking people from their homes. 274 In some
countries, prosecutors still retain the Stalin-esque power to order detention
in a psychiatric institution without prior medical opinion.275 These policies
are beginning to change, however, in the wake of a successful European
Court decision against the government of Bulgaria finding such detention
arbitrary and a violation of the European Convention.276
Although some countries require consent to treatment, hospital staff
routinely ignore it, and testimony from patients and former patients
indicates that staff rarely provide adequate information about the
277treatment. In many countries, hospital staff do not view the provision of
278information as therapeutic. For example, in Latvia, physicians and
nurses do not inform patients about their diagnosis and treatment out of
fear that it will increase the stigma faced by these patients in society.279
Conclusion
The issues over the rights of persons with a mental illness have been
around for millennia, but the debate over the right to refuse treatment in an
involuntary hospital setting has only arisen in the last few decades with the
advent of new psychotropic drugs. Advances in these medications will
probably continue to inform the debate for years to come, especially in
countries with economies that can afford these new drugs.
The debate between the medical model, emphasizing the right to
health and treatment, and the civil rights model, emphasizing the right to
equality and autonomy, has primarily influenced practice in North America
and Western Europe where a greater emphasis on civil rights is seen. The
debate has also spawned a middle ground, that of therapeutic jurisprudence.
As mental health takes on greater international importance, the debate is
likely to increasingly impact Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Central and
Eastern Europe, which are currently more likely to reflect the medical
model (to the extent that involuntary hospitalization and a right to refuse
273. Lewis, supra note 269, at 295.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. citing Varbanov v. Bulgaria, [2000] Eur. Ct. H.R. 31365/96, § 43-53, available
at <hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp?Cmd=Query>.
277. Id. at 295.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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treatment are issues at all). Already these countries have participated in the
formulation of the MI Principles, which reflect the debate between the
medical and the civil rights perspectives. Furthermore, as watchdog
organizations work to hold countries to the MI Principles and other human
rights treaty obligations, these organizations bring the debate over the right
to refuse treatment to countries that have historically not been involved for
cultural or economic reasons.
